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 CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION:  
THE NEXT STEP FOR  
CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The tale of Arthur Andersen‘s demise can still bring chills to many in 
corporate America.  The entity‘s operational days are a memory, but its story 
lives on as an infamous example of the stigma and nearly certain ruin a 
criminal prosecution can bring to a business.
1
  The lingering lesson from 
Arthur Andersen‘s downfall is that indictment alone is a ―death sentence for a 
large corporation.‖2  In contrast, the events leading up to the government 
bailout of American International Group, Inc. (AIG) during the 2008 financial 
crisis illustrate how avoiding criminal prosecution with the use of a deferred 
prosecution agreement (DPA) does not necessarily avoid a negative result.
3
  
While the Arthur Andersen situation proves corporate DPAs help large 
entities avoid the negative consequences of criminal prosecution, the result in 
AIG‘s case demonstrates that deferred prosecution does not always achieve 
the ethical reforms it sets out to accomplish.  Thus, while deferred prosecution 
can be a helpful tool for realigning businesses with ethical practices, the 
current system is not efficient at implementing the necessary changes. 
The goal of this Comment is to evaluate the deferred prosecution process 
in the corporate context and to advocate for the passage of legislation to 
regulate federal prosecutorial behavior so as to achieve lasting results from 
corporate DPAs.
4
  Similar to bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
 
1. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the „New Regulators‟: Current Trends in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 160 (2008) (acknowledging the ―severe 
collateral consequences of  indictment‖). 
2. Lynsey Morris Barron, Comment, Right to Counsel Denied: Corporate Criminal 
Prosecutions, Attorney Fee Agreements, and the Sixth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 1265, 1265 
(2009).   
3. In 2004, AIG Financial Products, led by President and Chief Executive Officer Joseph J. 
Cassano, entered into a DPA with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to stay prosecution for an alleged 
securities fraud violation.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department 
of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and AIG-FP Pagic Equity Holding Corp. (Nov. 30, 
2004), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/aig.pdf [hereinafter AIG Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement].  In 2008, AIG Financial Products and Cassano again became the subjects of 
DOJ scrutiny as a result of the company‘s risky financial behavior.  Jenny Andersen, A.I.G. Says It Is 
Subject of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at C3.   
4. The fact that this Comment discusses federal prosecutorial reform in the corporate context is 
not to suggest that businesses are more deserving of legislation that regulates prosecutorial conduct 
than individual criminal defendants.  While reform may or may not be needed in other areas of 
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the Bankruptcy Code,
5
 which allows a corporation to reorganize rather than 
fold in its attempt to pay off debt, giving a corporation the chance to right 
ethical wrongs under a DPA in lieu of proceeding with an indictment and 
prosecution can do a greater good for society.
6
  Both Chapter 11 and DPAs 
help avoid the harsh results of a large corporation folding and leaving 
thousands unemployed. 
This Comment argues that the passage of legislation in the corporate 
deferred prosecution arena will aid prosecutors in writing DPAs that 
appropriately punish and deter white collar crime while avoiding collateral 
consequences to businesses and employees.  Legislation can allay the risks 
inherent in today‘s deferred prosecution system, such as punishments that do 
not fit the crime, pressure to waive attorney–client privilege, non-payment of 
employee legal fees, and conflicts of interest in the appointment of a federal 
monitor to oversee implementation of the agreement.
7
 
The balance of this Comment proceeds as follows.  Part II will outline the 
origins of DPAs in the United States.  Part III will detail why legislative 
oversight of prosecutorial behavior in the corporate deferred prosecution 
context is necessary.  Part IV will track the development of stricter 
prosecutorial standards in DPAs by analyzing the provisions in three U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) memos and three corresponding agreements: (1) 
the 1999 Holder Memorandum
8
 and the corresponding 2001 Aurora Foods, 
Inc. pretrial diversion agreement,
9
 (2) the 2003 Thompson Memorandum
10
 
 
prosecutorial conduct, this Comment addresses only the corporate context.   
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (2006). 
6. See Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities Law, 
Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 979, 985 (2008).  
Reorganization, like deferred prosecution, is useful ―in situations where . . . more could be recovered 
by keeping a distressed business in operation than by dismembering its corpse.‖  Id.   
7. See Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecution Abuse in the 
Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 230 (2009) (explaining that legislation 
is needed to curb the ―ongoing prosecutorial abuse by federal prosecutors directed at corporations 
and corporate constituents under investigation‖). 
8. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att‘y Gen., to All Component Heads and 
U.S. Att‘ys on Federal Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder 
Memo].   
9. Pretrial Diversion Agreement Between the Office of the United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York and Aurora Foods, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/aurorafoods.pdf [hereinafter Aurora Foods Pretrial 
Diversion Agreement].   
10. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t 
Components and U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 
20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter 
Thompson Memo].   
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and the corresponding 2005 KPMG DPA,
11
 and (3) the 2006 McNulty 
Memorandum
12
 and the corresponding 2008 AGA Medical Corporation 
DPA.
13
  Part V will demonstrate how the 2008 Filip Memorandum,
14
 the 
Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Acts of 2007,15 2008,16 and 2009,17 and 
two bills recently presented to Congress
18
 evidence a desire in the legal 
community for tighter regulation.  Part V will conclude by urging Congress to 
recognize the current trend in DPAs towards a more regulated standard for 
prosecutors.  Not only should Congress reintroduce and pass the two above-
mentioned bills, H.R. 5086 and the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution 
Act of 2009, but it should pass additional legislation such as the Attorney–
Client Privilege Protection Act to form enforceable rights for businesses and 
to more closely regulate the conduct of prosecutors in the corporate deferred 
prosecution process. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS IN THE  
UNITED STATES 
A brief overview of the inception of the DPA is necessary to understand 
the current climate.  Recently, while administering the 2005 Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb DPA for securities fraud violations,
19
 federal prosecutors noted that a 
main goal of the agreement was to ―achieve improved corporate governance 
 
11. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the Office of the United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York and KPMG, LLP (Aug. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/kpmg.pdf [hereinafter KPMG Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement].  
12. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t Components 
and U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo].   
13. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and AGA Medical Corporation (June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/agamedical.pdf [hereinafter AGA Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement]. 
14. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t Components and 
U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Filip 
Memo].   
15. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).  
16. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008). 
17. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009).  
18. The two bills presented to Congress are the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 
2008, H.R. 6492, 110th
 
Cong. (2008) (reintroduced with identical language in the 111th Congress as 
H.R. 1947, 111th
 
Cong. (2009)) and H.R. 5086, 110th
 
Cong. (2008). 
19. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the 
District of New Jersey and Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company (June 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf [hereinafter Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement]. 
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and renewed market confidence without destroying a corporation and losing 
American jobs in the process.‖20  The Bristol-Meyers Squibb theme resonates 
in even the earliest diversion agreements, which generally did not involve 
U.S. Attorneys or business entities.
21
  Prosecutors first began deferring 
prosecutions for individuals, such as juveniles or first-time offenders, with the 
objective of allowing the individual to rehabilitate and re-enter society free 
from the stigma of a criminal conviction.
22
  Similarly, DPAs permit the 
federal government to reform a business organization‘s unethical practices 
without shutting down the business and thereby putting jobs and the economy 
in jeopardy.
23
 
Pretrial diversion agreements come in two variations: DPAs and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs).
24
  In a DPA, ―the prosecutor files a criminal 
charge against a company, but agrees not to prosecute the claim so long as the 
entity complies with the terms of a deferral agreement.‖25  In an NPA, no 
charges are filed at the outset but may be filed later if the corporation does not 
fulfill the terms of the agreement.
26
  Common terms of reform outlined in both 
DPAs and NPAs include federal monitoring, ―restitution, fines, additional 
auditing measures, termination of responsible individuals, and probation.‖27  
Additionally, in both DPAs and NPAs, the government may proceed 
criminally against the entity if the government believes the entity breached the 
agreement.
28
 
The first unofficial DPA occurred in 1992 and grew out of the 
government‘s investigation of Salomon Brothers for a securities fraud 
violation.
29
  The agreement was reached when Salomon Brothers complied so 
 
20. P.J. Meitl, Who‟s the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate America , 34 N. KY. L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (2007). 
21. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 163 (noting that deferred prosecution has existed 
for decades, beginning with deferred prosecutions for individual defendants).   
22. Id.  
23. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007).  One 
court described the consequences of a federal conviction for a business entity as a ―matter of life and 
death.‖  Id. (quoting United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).  Diversion 
agreements allow organizations to avoid the ―collateral consequences of an indictment‖ while 
achieving institutional reform.  Id.  
24. Throughout this Comment the author will refer to DPAs, NPAs, and pretrial diversion 
agreements interchangeably, as, though slightly different in definition, they are functionally the same 
for the purposes of this Comment.  
25. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 160. 
26. Meitl, supra note 20, at 14. 
27. Id. at 11. 
28. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 161.  
29. Id. at 163.  See generally Paul Mozer, Plea Bargain Cited in Salomon Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 1992, at L39 (noting that Salomon Brothers made substantial reforms pursuant to the 
government investigation).   
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substantially with the government‘s requests for reform that the U.S. Attorney 
on the case decided not to indict.
30
 
In contrast, today‘s DPAs, although lacking concrete direction from the 
DOJ or Congress, involve a more formal agreement process at the outset, 
which can be traced back to a 1994 agreement between the U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York and Prudential Securities.
31
  In exchange 
for a deferral of its prosecution for securities fraud for three years, Prudential 
agreed to the government‘s request for considerable internal reforms. 32  
Unlike today‘s culture wherein DPAs are very popular,33 the Prudential 
agreement was viewed as rare and unusual because it was one of the first of 
its kind.
34
  Similar to today‘s DPA process, the Prudential agreement was 
made without much direction from the DOJ. 
35
 
In 1999, the DOJ issued its first set of guidelines for federal prosecutors 
engaging in diversion agreements.
36
  The guidelines, entitled ―Federal 
Prosecution of Corporations,‖ consisted of a memo issued by then-Deputy 
Attorney General and current Attorney General Eric Holder.
37
  Since the 
issuance of the ―Holder Memo‖ in 1999, the DOJ has used pretrial diversion 
agreements to institute internal structural reform in over thirty-five business 
organizations,
38
 and has issued three additional, significant memos containing 
 
30. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 163 n.21.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 
Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury 
Securities Case (May 20, 1992) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.pdf.  ―Salomon‘s cooperation has been 
exemplary.  Such actions were virtually unprecedented in my experience.‖  Id. (quoting then-United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Otto Obermaier).    
31. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that Prudential Securities was the first 
major company to engage in a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ).   
32. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the 
Southern District of New York and Prudential Securities Incorporated (Oct. 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/prudential.pdf [hereinafter Prudential Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement]. 
33. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 166.  The corporate fraud outrages of the 2000s, such as 
the Enron Corporation scandal, pushed Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and President 
George W. Bush to create the Corporate Fraud Task Force to investigate and monitor corporate 
financial crimes.  Id. at 164–65.  The heightened focus on corporate crime sparked the increase in 
DPAs.  Id. at 166.  
34. Kurt Eichenwald, Prudential Agrees to Pay Investors for Fraud Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 1993, at A1 (noting that the Prudential settlement is ―highly unusual‖).   
35. Meitl, supra note 20, at 12.  At the time the Prudential Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
was made no official guidelines for prosecutors existed.  Id.   
36. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164.  The guidelines ―outlined various factors that 
prosecutors could consider in deciding the threshold question of whether to proceed against a 
company.‖  Id.   
37. Id. 
38. Garrett, supra note 23, at 855.  Large organizations with which the DOJ has entered into 
DPAs since 1999 include American International Group, Inc., America Online LLC, the Boeing 
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guidelines for prosecutors.
39
  Although each memo replaced its predecessor 
with more stringent guidelines for prosecutors, the broad discretion initially 
permitted under the Holder Memo has been difficult to retract.
40
 
III.  THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN THE  
CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION PROCESS 
A.  The Potential for Unfair Outcomes 
The existing standards for prosecutors in the DPA process consist of a 
series of memos issued by the DOJ to direct the prosecution decision.  The 
memos provide guidelines for ethical reforms of businesses but allow broad 
prosecutorial discretion; therefore, the memos do not adequately address the 
possibility that prosecutors may abuse their power in issuing DPAs and 
NPAs.
41
 
Unfairness may arise in at least four instances during the DPA process.  
First, punishments placed on businesses may be unrelated to the crime that 
precipitated the DPA.
42
  For instance, the Bristol-Meyers Squibb DPA, which 
resulted from an allegation of securities fraud, required the company to endow 
a chair in business ethics at Seton Hall, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney‘s law 
school alma mater.
43
  While beneficial to Seton Hall, the windfall did not 
advance the criminal justice system‘s goals of punishment and deterrence.44 
Second, if attorney–client privilege is waived, as it was in the Baker 
 
Company, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Computer Associates, Inc., HealthSouth Corporation, 
KPMG LLP, MCI, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Monsanto Company, among others.  Id.  
39. The Thompson Memo in 2003, supra note 10, the McNulty Memo in 2006, supra note 12, 
and the Filip Memo in 2008, supra note 14.  
40. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 245 (naming the Holder Memo‘s ―abuse-inviting 
problems‖ as the reason the Thompson Memo failed to create proper guidelines for U.S. Attorneys).   
41. Id. at 230 (explaining that legislation is needed to ―curb ongoing prosecutorial abuse by 
federal prosecutors directed at corporations and corporate constituents under investigation‖); Spivack 
& Raman, supra note 1, at 162 (advocating for legislation, or any change that would reform and 
standardize the DPA process).  
42. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 174.    
43. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 19, at 6.  
44. Similar criticism exists regarding distribution of uncollected consumer class action funds to 
charities.  Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed 
Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 731 (1987) (noting the ―policy against 
conferring windfall benefits on unaggrieved individuals‖).  Because courts are ―free to do almost 
anything with undistributed [consumer] class [action] funds,‖ the system is ―ad hoc, unpredictable, 
unguided by any normative principle, and open to the possibility of abuse.‖  Goutam U. Jois, The Cy 
Pres Problem and the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 258, 263 (2008).  If 
left unregulated, the DPA system could grow to mimic the cy pres system and charitable 
organizations may begin to lobby prosecutors to become the recipients of DPA funds.  See id. at 265.  
This process ―looks unseemly at best, and opens up the possibility of corruption at worst.‖  Id.   
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Hughes, Inc. DPA,
45
 unfairness may result if the government considers 
privilege-waiver an element of cooperation, thereby giving businesses an 
incentive to blame employees and ―find scapegoats within their ranks.‖46  
Similarly, the third way unfairness can result from the DPA process is if a 
business is pressured to cease contractually promised payment of legal fees 
for specific employees.
47
  Such pressure was found unconstitutional in United 
States v. Stein.
48
  While former Deputy Attorney General Thompson noted 
that employees ―don‘t need fancy legal representation if they believe that they 
did not act with criminal intent,‖49 others have criticized non-payment of legal 
fees as an attempt to make prosecution easier for U.S. Attorneys and 
cooperation more difficult for businesses by causing employees to distrust 
their employers and refuse to share information.
50
 
Fourth, because the selection of a federal monitor to watch over a business 
as it implements its reforms is unregulated, monitor compensation is often 
expensive for a business, monitors may be inexperienced in the business 
world, and monitor selection may not always align with the best interest of the 
business.
51
  For instance, U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie‘s appointment 
of his former boss, past Attorney General John Ashcroft, to the position of 
monitor for the Zimmer Holdings, Inc. DPA
52
 has been highly criticized 
because General Ashcroft‘s firm stood to collect $28 million to $52 million 
during the eighteen-month appointment period.
53
 
 
45. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Baker Hughes, Inc., 3 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bakerhughes.pdf.  Baker Hughes was offered a DPA 
due to an alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation.  Id.   
46. Inna Dexter, Regulating the Regulators: The Need for More Guidelines on Prosecutorial 
Conduct in Corporate Investigations, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 515, 526 (2007). 
47. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 230 (listing the advancement of legal fees as a ―key area‖ of 
unfairness); Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 169 (noting Judge Lewis Kaplan‘s holding in United 
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), as evidence that prosecutorial pressure to 
withhold legal fees can result in a constitutional violation).   
48. 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356. 
49. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247 (citing Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors‟ 
Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1 (quoting then-
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson)).   
50. Id. at 247–48.   
51. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 185–86.    
52. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the 
District of New Jersey and Zimmer Holdings, Inc., (Sept. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1136869/000095013707014977/c19011exv10w3.htm. 
53. Peggy Aulino, Deferred Prosecutions: Transparency and Accountability Lacking in 
Process for Picking Monitors, Dems Say, 4 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) 467 (July 3, 2009).  
―[M]embers of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law called [General 
Ashcroft‘s fee] ‗outrageous.‘‖  Id.  In addition, it is questionable whether Zimmer Holdings selected 
General Ashcroft or was pressured by the government to select him as monitor.  Id.   
882 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:875 
Finally, in addition to the above-noted concerns, the question still looms 
of when exactly a deferred prosecution is appropriate.
54
 
 B.  With or Without Deferred Prosecution, Two Corporate Giants Fall 
Due to the risks of abuse in the deferred prosecution process, public 
skepticism surrounding corporate deferred prosecution has arisen in recent 
years.
55
  While acceptance of a DPA may prevent the harsh consequences of 
prosecution, a DPA may not always prevent a business from committing 
similar ethical wrongs in the future, which indicates a problem with the DPA 
process.  The trouble becomes apparent after comparing the cases of Arthur 
Andersen and AIG. 
In Arthur Andersen‘s case, the DOJ offered the eighty-nine-year-old 
accounting giant an opportunity to offset its criminal prosecution for its role in 
the Enron Corporation scandal via a deferred prosecution agreement.
56
  Arthur 
Andersen refused to agree to reforms suggested by the DOJ, rejected the 
DPA, and quickly fell to its demise in the ensuing prosecution.
57
  In a matter 
of months, the company went out of business and 28,000 employees found 
themselves out of work.
58
  The lasting lesson from Arthur Andersen‘s fall is 
that indictment alone can ruin a business.
59
 
The benefits of deferred prosecution for Arthur Andersen are now clear: if 
the corporation had complied with internal reforms handed down from the 
U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Arthur Andersen not only would have received an 
ethical makeover, but it would have had an opportunity to right its wrongs 
 
54. Meitl, supra note 20, at 2 (questioning the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion in 
corporate affairs); Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 188 (calling for additional guidance from the 
DOJ on when a deferred prosecution is warranted).   
55. See, e.g., Editorial, It‟s Time to Put More Transparency into Deferred Prosecution Cases, 
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 25, 2009, at 19 (opining that the pretrial diversion process is 
relatively unregulated and lacks transparency).  
56. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165.  Arthur Andersen, while auditing Enron in late 
2001 pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, became aware of suspect 
financial practices at Enron.  Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 248–49.  In March 2002, after shredding 
documents related to its representation of Enron, Arthur Andersen was charged with ―one count of 
knowingly and corruptly persuading another person with intent to cause or induce any person to 
withhold documents from or alter, destroy, or mutilate documents for use in an official proceeding.‖  
Id. at 249.  The conviction was later reversed on the Supreme Court‘s finding that the jury 
instructions failed to properly convey the elements of the crime; however, the reversal did not save 
the business.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).   
57. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165; Floyd Norris, Execution Before Trial for Andersen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at C1.  Arthur Andersen was indicted after refusing to plead guilty to 
obstruction of justice charges and many predicted the prosecution would contribute to the firm‘s 
downfall.  Id.  
58. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 248; Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
59. See Barron, supra note 2, at 1265.   
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without the risk and harsh consequences of an indictment and criminal 
prosecution.
60
  Under the DOJ‘s offer, Arthur Andersen could have avoided 
the loss of ―billions of dollars in corporate value, thousands of jobs to 
American employees, investor confidence . . . and the ultimate destruction of 
[the] corporat[ion].‖61  For Arthur Andersen, deferred prosecution would have 
been a more graceful alternative by providing ―deterrence, restraint, and 
restoration,‖ while allowing the entity to stay in business, retain employees, 
and continue with work that required institutional knowledge.
62
 
In contrast to Arthur Andersen, AIG accepted a deferred prosecution offer 
from the DOJ as a result of a 2004 complaint charging AIG with aiding and 
abetting securities fraud.
63
  As part of the agreement, AIG accepted 
government supervision to rectify improper securities and accounting 
behavior.
64
  Regarding the agreement and the reforms to come under it, then-
Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray said, ―‗[t]here is no place in our 
markets for financial transactions that lack economic substance . . . .‖65 
Despite Assistant Attorney General Wray‘s commitment and the close 
government supervision of AIG implemented under the DPA, AIG suffered a 
severe liquidity crisis in September 2008 due to a rapid decline in the value of 
its credit default swap contracts that allowed purchasers ―to bet on the 
creditworthiness of debt obligations backed by [subprime] mortgages.‖66  The 
liquidity crisis caused AIG to lose billions of dollars, decreased the 
company‘s share price,67 and contributed significantly to the 2008 worldwide 
financial crisis.
68
  As a result of AIG‘s suspicious financial practices, in 2008 
the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched an 
investigation against the same AIG division led by the same person who 
accepted the DOJ‘s deferred prosecution offer in 2004 for securities fraud.69  
AIG‘s situation illustrates the DPA process is problematic when a 
 
60. Meitl, supra note 20, at 21–22 (acknowledging that a prosecution can be a ―death knell for 
a corporation‖).   
61. Id. at 21.  
62. Id. at 22. 
63. AIG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
64. Id. at 2.   
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, American International Group, Inc. Enters into 
Agreements with the U.S. (Nov. 30, 2004) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/November/04_crm_764.htm.  
66. Mary Williams Walsh & Jonathan D. Glater, Investors Turn Gaze to A.I.G, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 2008, at C1 (explaining that home values fell, thereby forcing AIG to decrease the values of 
the mortgages on its books).  
67. Id. 
68. Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Said to Be Stable, But Hurting for Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2009, at B1 (noting that when AIG‘s credit rating fell in 2008, its trading partners attempted to 
collect on their contracts, which contributed to the financial crisis).   
69. See supra note 3. 
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corporation, such as AIG, can enter into an agreement with the government to 
clean up its business practices but then continue to operate with questionable 
practices and cause more serious damage in the future.
70
 
In sum, DPAs are controversial because, although they can allow 
corporations to avoid an Arthur Andersen-like result via an agreement 
mandating ethical improvement in lieu of prosecution, in the process federal 
prosecutors have been given too much discretion to manage and rearrange the 
day-to-day dealings of corporate America, and they do not always do so 
successfully.
71
  There is no legal standard that (1) dictates transparency for the 
DPA process, (2) answers why diversion agreements are offered for some 
corporations but not others, (3) determines the appropriate level of 
punishment, or (4) mandates how government monitors of the offending 
corporation are to be selected or financially compensated.
72
  Thus, while a 
complete corporate collapse may be avoided with the use of a DPA, the risk 
of an AIG-like situation exists under the current DPA process. 
IV.  THE EVOLUTION OF HIGHER STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTORS 
DPA critics note that the agreements, while imposing ethical reforms on 
business entities, create ethical loopholes for prosecutors.
73
  The DOJ has tried 
to close some of the loopholes over the years through the issuance of 
successive memos, each memo replacing the last with new guidelines.
74
  
However, as this Part will show, through an analysis of three memos and a 
diversion agreement under each memo, the memos failed to create 
enforceable rights for the target businesses and, as a result, were unsuccessful 
at achieving the necessary check on prosecutorial conduct to ensure 
transparency and ethical conduct on both sides of the negotiating table.  The 
three DOJ memos analyzed in this Part are the 1999 Holder Memo, the 2003 
Thompson Memo, and the 2006 McNulty Memo.  The respective diversion 
agreements analyzed under each memo are the 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc. 
pretrial diversion agreement, the 2005 KPMG DPA, and the 2008 AGA 
Medical Corporation DPA. 
 
70. See Editorial, supra note 55, at 19.   
71. See Meitl, supra note 20, at 10.   
72. Editorial, supra note 55, at 19.   
73. Garrett, supra note 23, at 857 (noting that unchecked federal prosecutorial power led to a 
term in the New York Racing Association DPA that required the racing association to install slot 
machines at its race tracks to provide public school funding).  
74. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 166 (commenting on the replacement of the Holder 
Memo with the Thompson Memo in attempt to find a more balanced approach).   
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A.  Analysis of the 1999 Holder Memo and the 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc. 
Pretrial Diversion Agreement 
The Holder Memo aimed to guide prosecutors through the decision of 
whether to indict a business entity;
75
 however, the effect of the Memo was to 
deny businesses bargaining power over their agreements and allow 
prosecutors to demand sweeping reforms from businesses so they could avoid 
prosecution.  Although the Memo did not specifically mention deferred 
prosecution, it set out eight factors for prosecutors to consider in deciding 
whether to proceed against a business.
76
  Deputy Attorney General Holder 
expressed in his introduction to the Memo that the factors were neither 
binding nor dispositive.
77 
 Moreover, Deputy Attorney General Holder 
acknowledged that the factors may change over time, and stated that 
―[f]ederal prosecutors are not required to reference [the] factors in a particular 
case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded specific 
factors in reaching their decision.‖78  Thus, while the Memo was useful in that 
it gave prosecutors a starting point for the charging process, the Memo was 
not specific to the deferred prosecution scenario, it did not provide predictable 
rules for prosecutorial behavior, and it did not provide protection or 
enforceable rights for business entities under investigation. 
Among the most controversial elements of the Holder Memo was the 
imprecise definition of ―willingness to cooperate‖ in the fourth factor.79  
 
75. Holder Memo, supra note 8, at intro.  Deputy Attorney General Holder offered the Memo 
to provide ―guidance as to what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision 
whether to charge a corporation in a particular case.‖  Id.   
76. Id. § II(A).  The eight factors to be considered when charging a business entity as indicated 
by the Holder Memo were:  
 
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense . . . ; 
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation . . . ; 
3. The corporation‘s history of similar conduct . . . ;  
4. The corporation‘s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if 
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney–client and work product 
privileges . . . ;  
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation‘s compliance program . . . ;  
6. The corporation‘s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an 
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to 
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers . . . ;  
7. Collateral consequences . . . ;  
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies . . . .  
Id.   
77. Id. at intro.    
78. Id. 
79. See id. § II(A)(4).   
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Cooperation was controversial because the assessment of an entity‘s 
willingness to cooperate depended in part on whether the entity waived its 
attorney–client and work product privileges, whether the entity ―appear[ed] to 
be protecting its culpable employees and agents,‖ such as by advancing 
culpable employees‘ legal fees, and whether the entity engaged in sufficient 
remedial actions.
80
 
In addition, it was problematic for business organizations that 
―willingness to cooperate‖ was only one factor in the charging decision.81  
Despite significant cooperation, the government could decide to proceed with 
charging based on evaluation of the other factors in any order and weight, or 
based on the prosecutor‘s own preference.82  Thus, the Holder Memo has been 
criticized for its failure to address deferred prosecution specifically
83
 and for 
its lack of direction regarding what constitutes an entity‘s authentic 
cooperation with the government‘s investigation.84 
The 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc. pretrial diversion agreement, issued under 
the Holder Memo, illustrates the criticisms of the Memo.
85
  To begin, the term 
―deferred prosecution‖ was not mentioned in the agreement, which was 
reflective of the term‘s omission from the Holder Memo and shows how the 
Holder Memo was not closely tailored to the DPA scenario.
86
 
Aurora, in trouble for accounting fraud, agreed to substantial changes in 
its compliance program, such as hiring new directors at the DOJ‘s direction 
and firing employees involved in wrongdoing.
87
  Aurora acquiesced to hiring 
an independent monitor who was ―mutually acceptable‖ to both parties, yet 
the agreement lacked a definition of ―mutually acceptable‖ and lacked both a 
 
80. Id. § VI(B).  See also Ball & Boila, supra note 7, at 240.  ―[T]he corporation‘s cooperation 
may be critical in identifying the individual wrongdoers and locating probative evidence.  As such, 
the prosecutor should consider granting immunity or amnesty to the corporation in exchange for its 
cooperation with the government.‖  Id.   
81. Id.  ―Of course, a corporation‘s cooperation with the government is no guarantee of 
immunity or amnesty, and specific policies may still warrant prosecution regardless of the 
corporation‘s willingness to cooperate.‖  Id.  
82. Holder Memo, supra note 8, at intro. 
83. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that the ―Holder Memorandum made no 
formal mention of deferral‖).   
84. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1175 
(2006) (quoting critics calling the Holder Memo ―a requiem marking the death of privilege in 
corporate criminal investigations,‖ because it allowed prosecutors to demand almost whatever they 
wanted, including a privilege waiver, as a marker of authentic cooperation) (citing David M. Zornow 
& Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate 
Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147–48 (2000)). 
85. See generally Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9.   
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 2. 
2009] CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 887 
time limit for monitor oversight and a cap on the cost of the monitor.
88
  
Unchecked appointment of a federal monitor is dangerous for a corporation 
because the business and the monitor may not have the same business goals or 
knowledge.
89
 
Further, Aurora agreed to waive its attorney–client privilege.90  The 
statement of waiver in the agreement limited the government‘s discovery to 
information outside of litigation-related information; however, latter portions 
of the agreement established that cooperation sufficient to avoid a prosecution 
required Aurora to disclose all documents without hesitation, even those 
subject to attorney–client privilege.91  Waiver of attorney–client privilege 
creates the risk that the business may turn over documentation tending to 
―‗toss [employees] under the bus . . . to protect the company.‘‖92 
Finally, the DOJ‘s unilateral ability to revoke the agreement and 
prosecute
93
 severely limited bargaining power for Aurora.  Thus, a business in 
Aurora‘s situation did not have predictable standards by which to abide, and 
much power was left in the hands of U.S. Attorneys to dictate immediate 
disclosure, voluntary cooperation, termination of employees, a new 
compliance program, and other terms of corporate governance reform.
94
 
The terms of the Aurora agreement, while unbalanced, were not as 
inequitable as the terms of agreements that were to come.  The soft standards 
in the Holder Memo, such as the failure to address DPAs directly and the 
failure to define ―compliance,‖ left great power in the hands of prosecutors, 
opening the door to more relaxed standards in the future.
95
  Agreements like 
Aurora‘s, containing privilege waiver and nearly unlimited internal 
restructuring, presented an easy way for prosecutors to accomplish corporate 
ethics reforms while avoiding the hardships of a prosecution.
96
  However, 
 
88. Id. at 4. 
89. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 184–86.    
90. Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 4.   
91. Id. at 3–4. 
92. Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 n.8 (quoting Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Ex-Prosecutor Dishes 
Up Advice to GCs on Government Probes, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Oct. 17, 2007, at 4–5 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
93. Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 5. 
94. Id. at 2–3.   
95. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246 (noting that the Thompson Memo ―greatly 
intensified‖ the flaws of the Holder Memo).   
96. Meitl, supra note 20, at 22.   
 
Pretrial diversions then provide an alternative means for achieving 
prosecutorial ends including deterrence, restraint, and restoration without the 
imposition of severe collateral consequences on innocent victims.  
Corporations who agree to a pretrial diversion can continue to do business, can 
keep on [their] employees, and can carry on work that requires institutional 
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loose regulations led to poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
97
  So-called 
ethics reforms left businesses with little bargaining power so that punishments 
often did not match the crimes, as is evident in the KPMG DPA issued under 
the Thompson Memo. 
B.  Analysis of the 2003 Thompson Memo and the 2005 KPMG DPA 
The vague standards of the Holder Memo allowed for broad prosecutorial 
discretion and paved the way for the abuses that occurred under the DOJ‘s 
second advisory memo, ―Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations,‖ known as the ―Thompson Memo,‖ issued in 2003 by then-
Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson.
98
  Unlike the Holder Memo, 
the Thompson Memo was binding on prosecutors,
99
 officially sanctioned the 
use of DPAs by referring to them specifically,
100
 tried to clarify ―authentic 
cooperation,‖ and aimed to standardize the terms of diversion agreements by 
placing emphasis on evaluating a business‘s corporate governance program.101  
However, the Thompson Memo read more like an intimidating compliance 
guide for businesses rather than a prosecutorial guide for government 
attorneys.
102
  The two most significant and controversial features of the 
Thompson Memo—(1) authentic cooperation and (2) corporate governance 
and compliance measures
103—ultimately resulted in further entrenching the 
Holder Memo‘s pattern of nonbinding guidelines and expanding prosecutorial 
discretion, which became an accepted precedent and led to unbalanced DPAs 
such as the KPMG agreement.
104
 
The Thompson Memo increased prosecutorial focus on two main areas: 
(1) authentic cooperation and (2) corporate governance and compliance 
 
knowledge.   
Id. 
97. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 230 (noting that aggressive prosecutorial tactics have led to 
the need for reform in certain areas such as privilege waiver and advancement of legal fees).   
98. See Thompson Memo, supra note 10.   
99. Id. at intro.  The Memo required that ―prosecutors and investigators in every matter 
involving business crimes must assess the merits of seeking the conviction of the business entity 
itself.‖  Id.   
100. See id. § VI.  Unlike the Holder Memo, the Thompson Memo referred to ―pretrial 
diversion.‖  Id.   
101. Id. at intro. (emphasizing that the Thompson Memo focused on: (1) clarifying authenticity 
of cooperation and (2) ensuring compliance with corporate governance programs).   
102. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247 (noting that the factors in the Thompson Memo can be 
easily stacked against defendants).     
103. See Thompson Memo, supra note 10, at intro. 
104. See generally Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 167.  When the Thompson Memo gave 
prosecutors more leeway, prosecutors began to demand confidential information from businesses to 
stay prosecution.  Id.   
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programs.
105
  The Thompson Memo presented nine factors similar to the eight 
factors in the Holder Memo, with the addition of a new factor: ―the adequacy 
of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation‘s 
malfeasance.‖106  The additional factor relates to the Memo‘s first new 
emphasis, authentic cooperation, and carries over an abuse permitted under 
the Holder Memo—that prosecutors are encouraged to consider whether the 
corporation revealed confidential communications of potentially culpable 
employees as a marker of authentic cooperation.
107
  A significant risk when 
considering privileged information as a marker of cooperation is that it 
encourages corporations to implicate employees.
108
 
The emphasis on a business entity‘s cooperation with the government in 
the Thompson Memo was criticized for further expanding the power given to 
prosecutors because it seemingly encouraged prosecutors to view waiver of 
attorney–client privilege and nonpayment of culpable employees‘ legal fees as 
markers of authentic cooperation.
109
  Surprisingly, the actual language 
regarding privilege waiver did not differ between the Holder Memo and the 
Thompson Memo.
110
  However, the interpretation under the Thompson Memo 
led to more aggressive methods for gauging cooperation because the 
Thompson Memo, unlike the Holder Memo, was binding on prosecutors and 
therefore required them to always consider all of the Memo‘s factors, 
including cooperation, in the charging decision.
111
 
Moreover, cooperation became more influential as it was one of the only 
factors that could be changed after the offense was committed.
112
  Many of the 
other factors for consideration, such as the nature and seriousness of the 
offense, had already been set once the alleged crime occurred.
113
  The strong 
emphasis on cooperation and the fact that a business‘s level of cooperation 
could fluctuate led businesses to voluntarily disclose information before the 
 
105. Thompson Memo, supra note 10, at intro.     
106. Id. § II(A)(8). 
107. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 240 (acknowledging cooperation and voluntary 
disclosure under the Holder Memo was a source of prosecutorial abuse); Wray & Hur, supra note 84, 
at 1181–82 (conceding corporations may more readily offer up employees‘ misconduct if it will 
fulfill the authentic cooperation requirement).   
108. Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 n.7 (quoting Tucker, supra note 92, at 4–5). 
109. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247–48.     
110. Both the Holder Memo and the Thompson Memo require from suspect business entities a 
―timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and [their] willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation of [their] agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney–client and 
work product [privileges/protection].‖  Holder Memo, supra note 8, § II(A)(4); Thompson Memo, 
supra note 10, § II(A)(4).   
111. Id. at intro.   
112. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1171 (noting that aside from cooperation, ―most of the 
Thompson Memo factors are ones the company can do little to change‖).   
113. Id. 
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government requested it in attempts to cooperate to the utmost degree.
114
  
While advance disclosure could have reduced prosecutorial doubts about the 
authenticity of an entity‘s cooperation, it was also risky, as the entity was 
hedging its bets on the outcome that the government would find authentic 
cooperation instead of prosecuting based on the heightened disclosure of 
incriminating activity.
115
  Moreover, turning over privileged documents may 
have seemed like a prerequisite to fulfill the authentic cooperation 
requirement.
116
  Without a standard method to calculate whether a disclosure 
was too broad or too narrow to fulfill authentic cooperation, businesses were 
left without a true measure of their progress toward avoiding the collateral 
consequences of a prosecution, and most bargaining power was left in the 
hands of the prosecutor.
117
 
The Thompson Memo‘s second significant emphasis was on prosecutorial 
evaluation of the target business‘s corporate governance and compliance 
program to determine whether the program was effective not only on paper, 
but also in practice.
118
  The danger of allowing prosecutors to decide whether 
to prosecute based on the quality of an entity‘s compliance program was that 
not all prosecutors were experts in corporate governance and, thus, may not 
have had the tools to properly judge whether the compliance program was 
 
114. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246.  Corporations provided prosecutors with as much 
information as possible ―all in hopes that the government hammer would not swing the way of the 
corporation itself.‖  Id. at 248.   
115. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1144 (noting that voluntary disclosure is a ―calculated risk‖ 
for a business).  Fear of litigation following voluntary waiver of privilege was a ―major concern‖ for 
businesses.  Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246. 
116. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1173. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 1106.  The Thompson Memo provided prosecutors with the following guidance:    
In evaluating a compliance program, the Government will consider whether 
the program is designed in a manner that can be reasonably expected to deter, 
detect and disclose violations of law or regulation.  Specifically, prosecutors 
will ask the following questions: 
  Do the corporation‘s directors exercise independent review over proposed 
corporate actions, or do they unquestioningly ratify officers‘ 
recommendations? 
  Are the directors provided with information sufficient to enable the  
exercise of independent judgment? 
  Are internal audit functions conducted in a manner that ensures their 
independence and accuracy? 
  Have the directors established an information and reporting system in  
the organization reasonably designed to provide management and the board 
of directors with timely and accurate information sufficient to allow them to 
reach an informed decision regarding the organization‘s compliance with 
the law? 
Id. (citing Thompson Memo, supra note 10, § VII(B)).   
2009] CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 891 
effective.
119
  The danger was exacerbated when a prosecutor‘s decision in one 
case had potential industry-wide repercussions that could have unintentionally 
set the standard for corporate governance and compliance programs across the 
board.
120
 
The KPMG DPA
121
 resulted from KPMG‘s $2.5 billion federal tax 
evasion scheme, for which the DOJ filed a criminal tax case against KPMG.
122
  
According to then-U.S. Attorney Alberto Gonzales, KPMG was spared an 
indictment to avoid the collateral consequences of being a convicted large 
business entity, as were seen in the Arthur Andersen disaster.
123
  However, the 
consequences of the resulting DPA, which followed the Thompson Memo‘s 
emphasis on authentic cooperation and corporate governance, were severe and 
resulted in a lawsuit filed by former KPMG employees in which the court 
found the practices of the federal prosecutors on the case to be 
unconstitutional.
124
 
The court rightly reasoned that the terms of the KPMG DPA were severe.  
Under the agreement, KPMG ―agreed to shut down its entire private tax 
practice, to cooperate fully in the investigation of former employees, and to 
retain an independent monitor . . . for three years, in order to implement an 
elaborate compliance program.‖125  The independent federal monitor was 
Richard Breeden, a former SEC chairman, and the agreement did not limit the 
time during which KPMG‘s cooperation with the DOJ was required.126  As the 
monitor, Breeden had expansive powers; for example, he had unlimited access 
to KPMG information, such as e-mail, and the ability to hire a staff.
127
  
Breeden and his staff were paid out of KPMG‘s own pocket.128  Finally, and 
most controversially, in an effort to cooperate with the government and 
implement a viable compliance program, KPMG terminated the employment 
 
119. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1185–86.  ―Business organizations are right to be leery of 
the potential consequences of well-meaning but unsophisticated advice from criminal prosecutors on 
how best to ensure legal compliance.‖  Id. at 1185.   
120. Id. at 1185–86. 
121. KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 11.   
122. Garrett, supra note 23, at 862.  In United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2004), the court enforced the federal government‘s summons seeking information regarding 
KPMG‘s participation in alleged tax shelter transactions.  Id. at 31–32. 
123. Garrett, supra note 23, at 863 (noting former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales‘s 
belief that ―the reality [is] that the conviction of an organization can affect innocent workers and 
others associated with the organization, and can even have an impact on the national economy‖).   
124. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
125. Garrett, supra note 23, at 855. 
126. Id. at 864. 
127. Id. at 865. 
128. Id. 
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of culpable upper-level partners.
129
 
In response to the terminations, the government requested that, as a 
measure of authentic compliance, KPMG withhold the legal fees of indicted 
former employees, which was in contrast to KPMG‘s policy.130  The 
individuals at issue subsequently filed motions alleging that the DOJ 
pressured KPMG into declining to pay their legal fees in an effort to fulfill the 
cooperation requirement.
131
  The allegations were found to be true, as well as 
unconstitutional, by Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New 
York.
132
  In United States v. Stein,
133
 Judge Kaplan held that the government 
violated the KPMG employees‘ Fifth Amendment right to defend themselves 
by burdening access to counsel,
134
 and also violated their Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel by conditioning acceptance of the DPA on KPMG‘s 
agreement to withhold the legal fees.
135
 
Thus, while KPMG, in an effort to comply with government requests to 
clean up, implemented an ethics program to prevent future wrongdoings and 
terminated the employment of wrongdoers,
136
 the government interpreted the 
directions in the Thompson Memo broadly and took advantage of its powerful 
position.  This power play was evidenced by the request for nonpayment of 
legal fees, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the waiver of 
attorney–client privilege that risked encouraging KPMG to blame innocent 
employees, the seemingly biased appointment of a former SEC chairman to 
the role of independent monitor with unlimited power that risked a conflict of 
interest, the agreement‘s indefinite duration, and the fact that the expenses for 
the monitor and investigation all were billed to KPMG.
137
 
The unchecked prosecutorial discretion that created room for the 
questionable provisions of the KPMG DPA and Judge Kaplan‘s holding in 
Stein directly led to the reforms regarding attorney–client privilege waiver and 
advancement of legal fees as signs of cooperation found in the McNulty 
 
129. John J. Rehmann, Note, Paying the Price: Should Corporations‟ Payment of Their 
Employees‟ Legal Fees Be a Factor in Corporate Indictment Decisions?, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 
379, 393 (2008).  The KPMG firings were controversial because they illustrated the breadth of 
prosecutorial power over corporate defendants; the nonpayment of employee legal fees that followed  
the firings resulted directly from government inquiry into whether KPMG was obligated to pay its 
employees‘ legal fees.  See id.   
130. Id. at 393–94, 394 n.72. 
131. Garrett, supra note 23, at 865. 
132. Id.  
133. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
134. Id. at 356, 364–65. 
135. Id. at 367. 
136. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1141. 
137. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 863–66.  
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Memo.
138
 
C.  Analysis of the 2006 McNulty Memo and the 2008 AGA Medical 
Corporation DPA 
The result in Stein was a sign of major judicial backlash against the loose 
principles of the Thompson Memo.
139
  In response to dissatisfaction in the 
legal community,
140
 then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued a 
new memo to supersede the Thompson Memo, known as the ―McNulty 
Memo.‖141  The McNulty Memo tried to reform diversion agreement policies 
regarding attorney–client privilege and advancement of employee legal 
fees;
142
 however, as illustrated by the AGA Medical Corporation DPA, the 
Memo‘s suggestions were not strong enough to create significant change.143 
The McNulty Memo retained the nine factors of the Thompson Memo by 
which prosecutors made a charging decision.
144
  In an attempt to clarify how 
prosecutors evaluated the authenticity of a business entity‘s cooperation with 
a government investigation, the McNulty Memo added new language that 
addressed the issues of waiver and advancement of attorneys‘ fees for 
employees.
145
  For instance, before a request for privileged information could 
be made, prosecutors had to determine a ―legitimate need‖ for the 
information.
146
  Legitimate need was based on four factors: (1) the likelihood 
and degree of benefit the information would provide, (2) alternative means of 
obtaining the information, (3) voluntary disclosures already provided, and (4) 
the risk of negative consequences of a waiver to a corporation.
147
 
The McNulty Memo‘s procedure for obtaining a waiver of attorney–client 
privilege was significant because it not only defined a legitimate need for the 
 
138. Rehmann, supra note 129, at 395 (acknowledging the Stein court‘s finding that the 
Thompson Memo did not provide the least restrictive guidelines for the KPMG DPA as evidence of 
the court‘s discontent with the broad prosecutorial discretion permitted under the Thompson Memo) .   
139. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that Judge Lewis Kaplan found that the 
KPMG DPA, created under the Thompson Memo, resulted in a constitutional violation).  
140. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at 
C1.  ―‗I don‘t know if there are going to be more or less prosecutions,‘ said Stephen J. Bronis, 
[former] executive director of the white-collar crime committee of the American Bar Association, 
‗but there are hopefully going to be less abusive ones.‘‖  Id.  
141. McNulty Memo, supra note 12.   
142. The Memo noted that the DOJ did not intend for its corporate charging principles to 
discourage candid communication between employees and counsel.  Id. at intro. 
143. See AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13. 
144. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at § III(A).  
145. Id. § VII(B)(2)–(B)(3).  The new language was meant to make it easier for corporations to 
refuse to reveal privileged communications without the fear that doing so would lead to a 
prosecution.  Browning, supra note 140.  
146. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).   
147. Id. 
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information, but it broke information requests into two tiers: Category I and 
Category II.
148
  Category I information consisted of ―purely factual 
information, which may or may not [have been] privileged, relating to the 
underlying misconduct.‖149  Examples were copies of documents, witness 
statements, and factual summaries.
150
  To acquire Category I information, the 
requesting prosecutor was required to ―obtain written authorization from the 
United States Attorney who, prior to authorizing the request, [had to] provide 
a copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Criminal Division.‖151  If authorized, the request had to be communicated 
to the business in writing.
152
  Although the McNulty Memo created more 
oversight of privilege waivers by involving additional DOJ actors in the 
process, U.S. Attorneys could still consider the business‘s response to a 
request for Category I information in evaluating the business‘s overall 
cooperation with the government.
153
 
Category II information consisted of ―attorney–client communications or 
non-factual attorney work product,‖ such as ―legal advice given to the 
corporation before, during, and after the underlying misconduct occurred.‖154  
Category II information could be requested only in the ―rare circumstances‖ 
that Category I information did not yield a satisfactory result.
155
  To acquire 
Category II information, the prosecutor had to ―obtain written authorization 
from the Deputy Attorney General.‖156  In addition, and importantly, a 
business‘s refusal to divulge Category II information could not factor into a 
prosecutor‘s decision regarding whether the business substantially complied 
with the government‘s requests.157 
The addition of Category I and Category II information to the DOJ 
guidelines was noteworthy because it acknowledged what was already 
happening—prosecutors, while supposedly restricted to requests for factual 
 
148. Id.  Then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales supported creation of the two categories, 
asserting that ―[p]rivilege waivers will not be sought without internal process within the department, 
and will not be sought without need.‖  Lynnley Browning, Some Lawyers Urge More Safeguards on 
Rights in Corporate Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at C3.  However, critics called the 
approach a ―multitiered procedure for requesting business entities to disclose protected materials.‖  
Id. (quoting William M. Sullivan, Jr., a criminal defense lawyer at Winston & Strawn LLP). 
149. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).   
150. Id. 
151. William M. Sullivan, Jr., The McNulty Memorandum: New DOJ Policies on Attorney–
Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Protections, 15 METROPOLITAN. CORP. COUNS. 34  
col. 3. 
152. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. 
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information under the Thompson Memo, were actually requesting Category II 
information before the information was labeled as such.
158
 
The McNulty Memo took another bold step in the direction of DPA 
process reform; it instructed prosecutors to disregard whether a corporation 
was paying the legal fees for employees accused of wrongdoing as a lack of 
cooperation.
159
  The Memo made an exception, however, for cases where ―the 
totality of the circumstances show[ed] that [advancement of attorney‘s fees] 
was intended to impede a criminal investigation.‖160  Thus, the McNulty 
Memo was a stark shift away from the practices regarding legal fees under the 
Thompson Memo, where payment of legal fees for employees accused of 
wrongdoing was generally viewed as noncompliance with government 
requests for reform.
161
 
Overall, the McNulty Memo supported more reasonable practices, starting 
with the statements in its first paragraph.  The first opening lines of the 
McNulty Memo reminded both prosecutors and corporate leaders of their 
duties, cautioning that ―[d]irectors and officers owe . . . duties of honest 
dealing to the investing public,‖162 and stating that federal prosecutors should 
―recognize that they must maintain public confidence in the way in which 
they exercise their charging discretion [as] professionalism and civility have 
always played an important part in putting [the DOJ‘s] principles into 
action.‖163 
In the DOJ‘s search for ethics, the McNulty Memo helped revise two 
areas of prosecutorial abuse of discretion in the DPA process: (1) attorney–
client privilege and (2) advancement of attorney‘s fees.164  Although the 
McNulty Memo neglected to address selection of federal corporate monitors, 
the need for judicial oversight, ensuring punishments fit the crime, and a host 
of other issues that arise in the DPA process, the McNulty Memo was a step 
in the right direction toward increased transparency on both ends of the 
bargaining process.
165
  The progress was evident, but slow, as demonstrated 
 
158. See, e.g., Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 5.  The full 
disclosure required in the Aurora Pretrial Diversion Agreement is an example of a request for 
Category II information before considering whether the request is satisfied by Category I 
information.   
159. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(3). 
160. Id. n.3. 
161. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 167.  When the Thompson Memo gave 
prosecutors more leeway, prosecutors began to demand confidential information from businesses to 
stay prosecution.  Id.   
162. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § I.  
163. Id.  
164. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 254–55.   
165. Id. at 256 (noting the mixed reaction to the McNulty Memo).  See also Browning, supra 
note 140, at C4 (quoting New York City attorneys who were skeptical that the McNulty Memo 
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through the terms of the 2008 AGA Medical Corporation DPA.
166
 
The AGA Medical Corporation DPA, resulting from AGA‘s alleged 
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
167
 followed the 
McNulty Memo‘s prerogative that the government achieve its reforms in the 
―least intrusive‖ manner because the DPA contained terms that were more 
equitable than the terms in past agreements.
168
  First, unlike the KPMG DPA, 
the AGA Medical Corporation DPA contained a set end date for both the 
agreement and for monitor oversight—three years and seven days from the date 
on which the agreement was signed by all parties, subject to a one-year 
extension at the government‘s discretion.169  Second, the agreement established 
a process for selection of the independent federal monitor,
170
 as opposed to 
allowing a blanket appointment of the federal monitor by the government.  
Under the AGA Medical Corporation DPA, the company would propose a 
monitor that matched criteria set by the government, such as the ability to be 
objective and experience in the applicable area of fraud and compliance 
policies, and then the government would approve or deny the choice.
171
  
Compared to the Aurora agreement, which had no set end date clarification on 
the process of monitor selection or monitor qualification,
172
 the AGA agreement 
was more evenhanded because it involved AGA in the bargaining process. 
Furthermore, unlike the KPMG agreement, the terms of the AGA 
agreement were more proportional to the crime.  Because AGA was accused 
of violating the FCPA, the agreement mandated that AGA implement a 
compliance program aimed at preventing and detecting future FCPA 
violations and other anti-corruption laws.
173
  The focus on a revised 
compliance program was a remnant from the Thompson Memo‘s emphasis on 
compliance programs, and here, the compliance program was appropriately 
linked to the crime. 
Although the AGA Medical Corporation DPA evidenced progress, it was 
not cured of imbalances, especially regarding attorney–client privileged 
information.  AGA‘s limited bargaining ability was seen in an express clause 
permitting AGA to refuse to disclose privileged information upon ―a valid 
claim of attorney–client privilege or application of the attorney work-product 
 
would be able to achieve the desired reforms without the force of law).   
166. See AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13. 
167. Id. at 1. 
168. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).  See generally AGA Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, supra note 13.   
169. AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13, at 2. 
170. Id. at 8–9. 
171. Id. 
172. See Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9. 
173. AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13, at 7. 
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doctrine.‖174  However, in direct opposition to the requirements of the 
McNulty Memo, the agreement permitted the government to take 
nondisclosure into account when determining substantial compliance.
175
  
Furthermore, there was no mention of how advancement of attorneys fees 
would be handled or viewed by the government, which was one of the key 
reforms the McNulty Memo intended to make.
176
  Thus, the AGA Medical 
Corporation DPA illustrates that, although each successive DOJ memo has 
made progress toward more equitable bargaining, the memos do not provide 
enforceable causes of action for business entities and thus cannot go as far as 
congressional legislation can to create equity in the DPA process.
177
 
The 2008 Filip Memo created slightly more bargaining room for business 
entities; however, the real shift should come from Congress with the passage 
of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act, the Accountability in 
Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086. 
V.  THE SHIFT TO INCREASED REGULATION OF CORPORATE DEFERRED 
PROSECUTION PROCEDURES 
The 2008 Filip Memo, the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 
2009, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086 
demonstrate the desire in the legal community to tighten the regulation on the 
prosecutorial side of the DPA process in order to achieve greater fairness in 
DPAs through increased predictability and heightened ethical rules for 
prosecutors.
178
  This Part will address the progression of heightened 
prosecutorial standards and will advocate that the stricter standards in the 
Filip Memo are a good start, but true improvements to the DPA process will 
come from Congress‘s passage of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection 
Act, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086. 
A.  The 2008 Filip Memorandum 
In response to criticism that the McNulty Memo did not sufficiently solve 
 
174. Id. at 4. 
175. Id. 
176. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 254–55 (noting that the McNulty Memo offered new 
guidance in regard to advancement of legal fees).   
177. Letter from Former United States Attorneys to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman,  
S. Judiciary Comm., (June 20, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://federalevidence.com/ 
pdf/2008/06-June/USAtty_LeahyLttr6-23-2008.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter].  Thirty-three 
former U.S. Attorneys signed a letter addressed to Senator Leahy and his colleagues on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to urge the senators to support the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 
2007 because the former prosecutors believed the McNulty Memo, without the force of law, was 
insufficient to achieve privilege reforms.   
178. The June 2008 U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter from thirty-three former prosecutors also supports 
the trend toward tighter regulation.  See id. 
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the problems with prosecutorial requests for waiver of attorney–client 
privilege,
179
 the Filip Memo, issued by former Deputy Attorney General Mark 
R. Filip in 2008 to replace the McNulty Memo, contributes to the trend 
toward stricter regulations for prosecutors entering the DPA process by 
prohibiting attorney–client privilege waiver as a component of the 
prosecutor‘s evaluation of a business entity‘s authentic cooperation.180  
Instead, the Filip Memo requires prosecutors to measure cooperation by the 
extent to which the entity timely and voluntarily discloses the ―relevant facts‖ 
concerning the misconduct.
181
  In addition, the Filip Memo is incorporated 
into the United States Attorneys‘ Manual, an internal DOJ document that 
guides the work of DOJ employees but does not have the force of law.
182
 
Although the Filip Memo is a step towards greater fairness in the DPA 
process because it limits prosecutorial requests for attorney–client privileged 
information, it does not altogether do away with prosecutors doling out 
mitigating credits for cooperation.
183
  Therefore, it leaves potential for 
confusion in the definition of authentic cooperation, which was the difficulty 
under the Thompson Memo.
184
 
Further, it is likely that any agreement to come under a DOJ memo would 
risk ethical abuses.  DOJ directives, while supposedly binding on prosecutors, 
 
179. Robert J. Kipnees & Khizar A. Sheikh, The Investigation and Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, 16 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 49 (2008).  See, e.g., U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra 
note 177, at 3.   
The 2006 McNulty Memorandum, which was heralded as a much-needed fix 
to the 2003 Thompson Memorandum, is inadequate . . . .  [T]he Memo 
provides oversight of privilege waiver requests by the U.S. Attorney or Main 
Justice.  However, a report written by the Honorable E. Norman Veasey, 
former Chief Justice of the state of Delaware, found that prosecutors in the 
field are still requesting or demanding privilege waivers without the 
supervision required by the McNulty Memorandum.   
Id.  The danger of privilege waiver is that it may encourage businesses to seek out employee 
scapegoats.  Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 nn.7–8 (citing Tucker, supra note 92, at 4–5).    
180. Filip Memo, supra note 14, § 9-28.710 
181. Id. § 9-28.720. 
182. United States Attorneys‘ Manual, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).  The Filip Memo is incorporated as §§ 9-28.000–9-28.1300.    
183. Former Deputy Attorney General McNulty criticized the Filip Memo saying, ―there is still 
a pressure to waive attorney–client privilege if you have ‗relevant factual information‘ covered by 
attorney–client privilege that the government wants to get.  And quite a bit of ‗relevant factual 
information‘ is subject to privilege claims.‖  Brian Baxter, With Thompson Trashed and McNulty 
Moot, Filip Memo‟s Time Has Come, AM LAW DAILY, Aug. 28, 2008, 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/08/with-thompson-t.html.   
184. See Kipnees & Sheikh, supra note 179, at 49; Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip 
Memorandum: Does It Go Far Enough?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 2008, at  4, 9.  The problem with the 
Filip Memo‘s definition of authentic cooperation is that ―relevant facts‖ may also be privileged 
information, or may be work product.  Stein & Levine, supra.  Thus, businesses may often end up 
waiving privilege to provide the government the relevant information it requires.  Id.   
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do not create rights for business entities and do not have the force of law 
behind them.
185
  In addition, the memos do not apply to all federal agencies; 
they apply only to the DOJ.
186
  Thus, when prosecutors disregard memo 
provisions, business entities have no legal recourse, unless, as seen in the 
KPMG scenario, in violating memo provisions, prosecutors also violate law. 
Despite the DOJ‘s reforms under each successive memo, the reforms have 
not implemented sufficient improvement in the areas of attorney–client 
privilege waivers, punishments that may be unrelated to the alleged crime, 
non-payment of employee legal fees, and problems with monitor selection 
such as a conflict of interest or lack of business experience.  Thus, 
congressional action is needed to create enforceable rights for business 
entities in DPA negotiations.
187
 
B.  Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Acts of 2007, 2008, and 2009 
Attorney–client privilege is an esteemed principle of the U.S. justice 
system, and it plays a prominent role in corporate criminal liability.
188
  
Without attorney–client privilege, corporate compliance programs would be 
less effective as employees may fear disclosure of protected information and 
be reluctant to report problems and seek advice; ultimately, the necessary 
lucidity between a business entity‘s legal department and the entity‘s 
employees would disappear.
189
 
 
185. U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 3.  ―The time has come to pass legislation that 
protects the existing rights of individual employees and business organizations.‖  Id.   
186. Id.  Agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States 
Department of Housing and Development, the Federal Communications Commission, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency all have policies similar to the DOJ‘s policy of requiring privilege 
waiver as a method of cooperation.  Id.  Because DOJ memos do not protect business entities from 
interactions with any of these agencies, legislation that would apply to all agencies is a more 
effective route to accomplishing more equitable DPAs.  Id.   
187. Id. (advocating that because the DOJ has not made changes to ensure protection of 
business entities and employees, it is up to Congress to pass a law that provides the necessary 
protection).   
188. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the purpose of 
attorney–client privilege is to ―encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice‖); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Back Against the Wall: Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Through the Lens of Contract “Policing”, 23 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (2008) (conceding that 
attorney–client privilege is a ―principle[] with strong constitutional, evidentiary, and/or ethical 
roots‖).   
189. Id.; U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 2–3, 3 n.1. (suggesting that the breakdown 
in communication between an employee and the employer‘s counsel is already happening).  See 
Transcript of Testimony of Susan Hackett, General Counsel, Association of Corporate Counsel, 
Before the United States Sentencing Commission (Mar. 15, 2006) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/03_15_06/Hackett-Testimony.pdf (describing the results of a survey 
that found privilege erosion occurring in the majority of requests for privilege waiver from U.S. 
Attorneys).   
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Congressional legislation is paramount to protecting attorney–client 
privilege because it will create legally enforceable ethical standards for 
prosecutors.
190
  Congress is the appropriate body to build concrete standards 
for prosecutors as it is ―endowed with the constitutional authority to . . . 
regulate federal officers . . . .  As a national entity, its regulations would 
preclude the possibility of disuniformity and lack of guidance.‖191  
Furthermore, Congress can form neutral groups to study and advise on the 
matter and has lobbies on both sides of the issue, thus giving Congress the 
least biased and most complete view of the situation.
192
 
Objections to the DOJ‘s minimalist regulation of prosecutorial conduct 
through memos became evident with Senator Arlen Specter‘s introduction of 
the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act in 2007 (2007 Act),193 and 
reintroduction of the Act in 2008 (2008 Act)
194
 and in 2009 (2009 Act).
195
  
The 2007 Act, passed by the House of Representatives, would protect 
attorney–client privilege to preserve the effectiveness of compliance 
programs, internal investigations,
196
 the workings of the adversarial system of 
justice,
197
 and ultimately ―place on each agency clear and practical limits 
designed to preserve the attorney–client privilege and work product 
protections available to an organization and preserve the constitutional rights 
and other legal protections available to employees of such an organization.‖198  
The 2007 Act supports its suggested reforms by noting that ―officers or 
employees of Government agencies have been able to, and can continue to, 
conduct their work while respecting attorney–client and work product 
protections and the rights of individuals, including seeking and discovering 
facts crucial to the investigation and prosecution of organizations.‖199  The 
2008 and 2009 Acts have substantially similar goals to the 2007 Act.
200
  The 
2008 Act clarifies certain provisions,
201
 as does the 2009 Act.
202
 
 
190. U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 3. 
191. Ryan E. Mick, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1251, 1291 (2001). 
192. Id. 
193. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007). 
194. S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008). 
195. S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009). 
196. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § (2)(a)(4). 
197. Id. § (2)(a)(6). 
198. Id. § (2)(b). 
199. Id. § (2)(a)(5). 
200. See S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009). 
201. Andrew Gilman, The Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect of 
Congressional Intervention into the Department of Justice‟s Corporate Charging Policy , 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1100–01 (2008) (explaining that the 2008 Act is more detailed, allows 
prosecutors greater flexibility in requesting information from businesses, and clarifies that the 
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Passage of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act is a necessary 
step toward a more balanced negotiating process for corporate diversion 
agreements.  The legislation would reduce the dangers inherent in the current 
DPA process, such as coerced privilege waiver, the DOJ‘s unilateral ability to 
modify the memos, continually changing DOJ policy, and potential disregard 
of employees‘ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  Without 
congressional legislation of this nature, business entities will have to wait for 
a scenario, such as the circumstances attending the KPMG DPA where 
prosecutors break already enacted law, before the entity can obtain a legal 
remedy. 
C.  The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R. 5086 
In December 2007, Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr. of New Jersey issued a 
―Statement of Principles on Deferred Prosecution Agreements‖ (Statement).203  
The Statement is further evidence of the push from those involved in the DPA 
process for more concrete DPA guidelines for prosecutors.  In light of 
prosecutorial wrongs,
204
 Congressman Pascrell called for written guidelines 
on DPAs to hold federal prosecutors accountable for their actions and for 
judicial oversight to introduce a neutral party into the DPA process.
205
  
Pascrell also implored Congress to relieve federal prosecutors of the 
responsibility of selecting the monitor to avoid appearing biased toward the 
U.S. Attorney‘s Office.206  Finally, Pascrell asked for full disclosure of DPAs 
so that the agreements may be held to public scrutiny.
207
 
Subsequent to the Statement, Pascrell introduced the Accountability in 
Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008 (Accountability Act).
208
  The 2008 version 
 
government is prohibited from considering privilege waiver in its charging decision).   
202. 154 CONG. REC. S2331–32 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter) 
(explaining subtle changes in the 2009 Act include definition of the term ―organization‖ and other 
ambiguities). 
203. Office of Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., Statement of Principles on Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements (Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/ 
files/statement_of_principles_on_deferred_prosecution_agreements_dec_17_2007.pdf. 
204. Id.  The Statement cites the terms of the 2005 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement as an example of a prosecutorial wrong because the terms did not relate to 
the alleged violation.  For instance, Bristol-Meyers Squibb removed its chief executive officer and 
general counsel at the suggestion of its federal monitor, although the chief executive officer and 
general counsel‘s actions were unrelated to the securities fraud allegations that led to Bristol-Meyer 
Squibb‘s DPA.  Id.  The Statement also cites the Zimmer Holdings, Inc. DPA wherein former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft was appointed as federal monitor while his former employee was 
overseeing the case.  Id.  Ashcroft earned over $52 million in eighteen months, giving the impression 
of ―impropriety and political favoritism‖ in selection of the federal monitor.  Id.   
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. H.R. 6492, 110th
 
Cong. (2008). 
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was not passed, but an identical version was reintroduced in 2009.
209
  The 
focus of the Accountability Act is ―to promote uniformity and to assist 
prosecutors and organizations as they negotiate and implement‖ DPAs, and it 
requires the Attorney General to ―issue public written guidelines‖ for 
DPAs.
210
  The Accountability Act requests reforms similar to those suggested 
in Congressman Pascrell‘s 2007 Statement and elaborates on specific details, 
such as circumstances when an independent monitor is warranted, terms and 
conditions that may be appropriate for an agreement, a process for 
determining authentic cooperation, duration of the agreement, selection and 
compensation of the federal monitor, restrictions relating to agreements, the 
need for judicial oversight, and public disclosure of agreement terms.
211
 
Independent of the Accountability Act, Congressman Frank Pallone 
introduced H.R. 5086 in 2008, a bill that asks Congress ―[t]o require the 
Attorney General to issue guidelines delineating when to enter into deferred 
prosecution agreements, to require judicial sanction of deferred prosecution 
agreements, and to provide for [f]ederal monitors to oversee deferred 
prosecution agreements.‖212  The provisions of H.R. 5086 are similar to the 
provisions of the Accountability Act in that they offer guidelines for when to 
enter a DPA, provide a definition of cooperation, request judicial oversight of 
the DPA process, and present suggestions for monitor selection.
213
 
Both the Accountability Act and H.R. 5086 demonstrate the growing 
sentiment among members of Congress that legislative action is needed to 
create stronger guidelines for prosecutors in the DPA process.  If passed, these 
bills would supplement the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act by 
reducing prosecutorial abuses outside of the privilege issue.  As with 
privilege, enforceable remedies for businesses are needed regarding the topics 
the Accountability Act and H.R. 5086 address, such as circumstances when an 
independent monitor is warranted, how agreement terms are to be established, 
identifying breach of an agreement, what constitutes cooperation, and 
standards for appropriate punishment. 
VI.  CONGRESS SHOULD REGULATE THE CORPORATE DEFERRED 
PROSECUTION PROCESS 
As seen through recent judgments, proposed legislation, and memos 
issued by the DOJ, there is increasing desire from participants in the DPA 
process for regulation of prosecutorial behavior in the DPA context.  This 
 
209. H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009).   
210. Id. § 4(a). 
211. See generally id. 
212. H.R. 5086, 110th
 
Cong. (2008). 
213. See generally id. 
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concern has been followed by a push to create more stringent guidelines for 
prosecutors in corporate DPA procedures. 
The evolution of the DPA process, which began with loose regulations 
under the Holder Memo and, under the Thompson Memo, permitted 
questionable prosecutorial practices that the McNulty Memo subsequently 
attempted to remedy, is evidence of the importance of developing  enforceable 
legal standards for federal prosecutors to follow in DPA negotiations.  Each 
subsequent DOJ memo brought new reforms and tried to slightly narrow the 
scope of prosecutorial power.  The DOJ‘s most recent memo, the Filip Memo, 
is a step toward tighter regulation of prosecutorial behavior, as it requests 
more equitable corporate cooperation standards.
214
 
However, not only is it important that the DOJ attempt to reform 
prosecutorial behavior through memo provisions, action also is needed from 
Congress to recognize and enforce the current trend toward a regulated 
standard for prosecutors.  Without congressional oversight, such as the 
reforms suggested by the proposed Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act 
and the provisions of the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R. 
5086, business entities generally will not have legal remedies to counter a 
prosecutor‘s violation of memo provisions, unless a KPMG-like abrogation of 
rights occurs. 
For instance, despite the McNulty Memo‘s direction to disregard 
nondisclosure of attorney–client privileged information when determining 
substantial compliance, the AGA Medical Corporation DPA still allowed for 
this consideration, as well as disregarded other significant McNulty Memo 
directives such as providing clarification in the agreement of how 
advancement of legal fees would factor into the substantial compliance 
analysis.  Thus, while each successive DOJ memo has made ethical 
advancements, the advancements are of no worth without a legal mechanism 
for enforcement.  DOJ memos do not have the requisite strength that enacted 
legislation would have to implement legal rights for business entities to ensure 
that punishments are related to the alleged crimes, waiver of attorney–client 
privilege does not encourage corporations to create employee scapegoats, 
nonpayment of employee legal fees does not rise to unconstitutional levels, 
and the federal monitor is not inexperienced or faced with a conflict of 
interest. 
The Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act, if passed, will provide a 
good remedy because it would allow businesses to validly assert their rights to 
 
214. Kipnees & Sheikh, supra note 179, at 49 (noting that the Filip Memo brings the DPA 
process to a higher ethical standard by discouraging privilege waivers and nonpayment of 
employees‘ legal fees as signs of compliance with government investigations, instead looking to the 
corporation‘s voluntary disclosure of ―relevant facts and evidence‖). 
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attorney–client privilege without fear that this would result in a judgment of 
noncooperation.
215
  However, attorney–client privilege waiver is not the only 
abuse occurring in the DPA process.  The only way to truly cure the problems 
inherent in today‘s system of deferred prosecutions is for Congress to create 
enforceable rights for business entities through direct legislation outlining the 
prosecutorial ―do‘s‖ and ―do not‘s‖ of pretrial diversion agreements.  Without 
regulations from Congress, such as the suggestions in the Accountability in 
Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R. 5086 regarding judicial oversight, 
definitions of authentic cooperation, and public disclosure of DPA terms, 
federal prosecutors still will be permitted to implement or avoid implementing 
memo provisions at their discretion, as was the case for Aurora, KPMG, and 
AGA. 
Just as U.S. Attorneys provide an ethics check on business entities, so too 
should congressional regulations provide a check on prosecutorial 
performance.  Congressional legislation of DPAs will acknowledge that the 
agreements are necessary to avoid an Arthur Andersen-like demise when a 
DPA is not implemented, as well as to avoid an unsuccessful DPA such as 
AIG‘s agreement, wherein change is not realized effectively.  Transparency in 
prosecutorial conduct will better accomplish the criminal justice system‘s 
goals of punishment and deterrence while affecting ethical reform on both 
sides of the negotiating table. 
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